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ABSTRACT
Traditional accounts of decision-making under uncertainty have taken the Von Neumann and Morgenstern approach of
Expected Utility Theory that considers how decisions under uncertainty should be made. This prescriptive model states that,
when faced with a choice, a rational decision maker will pick the prospect that offers the highest expected utility. But as has
been demonstrated by Kahnemann and Tversky in Prospect Theory, decision-making under uncertainty often deviates from
what Expected Utility Theory predicts, largely depending on whether the decision is framed as a gain or a loss. According to
their model, choices framed as gains often lead to risk–averse behavior, and choices framed as losses often induce risk-
seeking behavior. This paper reviews various theories of decision-making under uncertainty and evaluates the relevance of
Prospect Theory in the information security context. An instrument is developed to evaluate relevance, preliminary results are
presented, and implications for future research are discussed.
Keywords
Information Security, Prospect Theory.
1. INTRODUCTION
Traditional accounts of decision-making under uncertainty have taken the Von Neumann and Morgenstern approach of
Expected Utility Theory (EUT). This prescriptive model states that, when faced with a choice, a rational decision maker will
pick the prospect that offers the highest expected utility. However, there is a lot of evidence that decision-making under
uncertainty often deviates from what EUT predicts. Prospect Theory (PT) was developed to account for how people actually
behave. It is a descriptive model that argues that the choice of decision makers depends on whether the decision is framed as
a gain or a loss. This paper evaluates the relevance of Prospect Theory in the context of investments designed to improve
information security.
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follow.  Section  2  reviews  EUT  and  PT  and  discusses  the  relevance  of  PT  in  the
investment in security domain. Section 3 evaluates the applicability of PT to decisions concerning investments in security.
Section 4 discusses the results of a preliminary experiment. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. DECISION-MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY – THE CASE OF INFORMATION SECURITY
Expected Utility Theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) is a normative approach that considers how decisions under
uncertainty should be made. According to this theory, people should make choices after either explicitly or implicitly
calculating an option's likely effect on their final asset position. The theory is described in terms of utilities (ordinal
preference functions) and probabilities. Barring a few exceptions (e.g., Friedman and Savage, 1948, consider utility functions
with both concave and convex segments), utility is typically considered concave over the entire domain.
 1252
Arora et al.  Looking at Information Security through a Prospect Theory Lens
Proceedings of the Twelfth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Acapulco, Mexico August 04th-06th 2006
Most of the literature on information security investments has taken an Expected Utility Theory approach to decision making
under risk. Gordon and Loeb (2002) derive an economic model that determines the optimal amount to invest in information
security for risk-neutral firms. They argue that the key in analyzing information security decisions is not the vulnerability (or
the expected loss without investment in security), but the reduction in expected loss with the investment in security. Gordon
and Loeb determine the optimal level of investment by maximizing the expected benefit of investment in security which is
expressed in terms of the probability of a threat occurring, the probability of a realized threat being successful, and the loss of
a realized threat. They conclude that the optimal investment for protecting a given information set has an inverted parabolic
relationship with the information set’s vulnerability. Huang, Hu and Behara (2005) demonstrate that similar results apply to
risk-averse firms.
Gordon and Loeb,  as  well  as  Huang,  Hu and Behara  assume that  decision  makers  behave  in  accord  with  EUT.  However,
there is ample evidence that decision-making under uncertainty often deviates from EUT predictions (Tversky and
Kahnemann, 1974; Hogarth and Einhorn, 1990; Tversky and Koehler, 1994; Kuhn and Budescu, 1996; Fox and Tversky,
1998). Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahnemann, 1974; Kahnemann and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahnemann, 1981) is
a descriptive model that was developed to account for how people actually behave. According to this theory, people monitor
gains or losses (deviations from the status quo or some other salient reference point), not final asset positions, while making
decisions. The theory is described in terms of both a weighting function and a value function. The weighting function is non-
linear, and it under-weights high probabilities and over-weights low probabilities. The value function is concave over gains,
but convex and steeper over losses. Together, these functions lead to four different risk attitudes: risk seeking for gains of low
probability, risk aversion for losses of low probability, risk aversion for gains of high probability, and risk seeking for losses
of  high  probability.  In  other  words,  PT  puts  forth  the  argument  that  decision  makers  may  be  risk  seeking  under  certain
circumstances.
It is not clear whether PT or EUT applies to decisions involving optimal security investment. This is because investment in
security is really about two kinds of losses – the expected loss from a security breach, and the cost of investment in security.
Given that PT predicts risk seeking behavior for losses that occur with a high probability (plausible in today’s security
environment) firms may well be risk seeking in their behavior concerning investment in information security. However, there
are several context-specific reasons why decision makers may behave in accord with EUT when considering investments in
information security. First, absolute losses due to security breaches can far exceed those experimented with in PT, possibly
instilling risk aversion even in the case of losses. Second, since decision makers involved in security investment decisions
would  be  held  personally  responsible  should  there  be  a  breach,  they  may  exhibit  more  risk-averse  behavior.  Third,  in
choosing security investments, decision makers might properly ignore sunk cost effects because a minimum amount of
security is mandated. Our study represents an initial attempt to determine whether PT or EUT more accurately models
decision making behavior in the domain of information security investments.
3. RESEARCH METHOD
To study the applicability of PT in the context of optimal investment in information security, we modified the instrument
used by Tversky and Kahnemann in their seminal papers (1974; 1979; 1981). Table 1 details the hypotheses tested (in
italics), the instrument, the expected responses (in bold), and the observed responses (in bold italics).
Thirty four students enrolled in an information security course responded to our survey. The ordering of the questions in the
instrument was randomized to remove any ordering effects. Data pertaining to 4 subjects were discarded due to
incompleteness and suspicious responses (i.e., same choice was picked through the entire survey). We also collected
demographic data such as age and gender, personal risk assessment, nature of job, and recent security breach history in the
survey.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In  the  third  column  of  Table  1,  the  results  in  bold  are  supported  (but  not  significant),  those  in  bold  and  marked  with  an
asterisk are significant, and the rest aren’t supported. The test statistic used was the one-proportion, one-tailed z-test (H0:
proportion of successes for population = 0.5; H1: proportion of successes for population > 0.5; 0.05a = ; n = 30).
Hypothesis 1 tests the basic premise of PT that people are risk averse with gains (1a) and risk seeking with losses (1b). While
1a was significantly supported, 1b was not supported. In fact, a majority of subjects made decisions opposite to that predicted
by PT (p < 0.05). This may be because1b was not framed clearly enough as a choice between two losses. It is also likely that
people react differently to losses when they are personally held responsible for the loss (as in the security investment case). It
has also been suggested in the past literature (e.g., Harbaugh, Krause and Vesterlund, 2002) that while subjects’ risk attitudes
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are  consistent  with  PT when pricing  gambles,  the  theory  is  not  robust  when choosing between a  gamble  and its  expected
value.





[People overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to outcomes which are merely
probable (certainty effect)]
Scenario: You estimate the expected loss that would result from a successful attack at $6 million.
Given that estimate, which of the following two options would you choose?
a. Security package #1, which will reduce estimated losses by $2 million.
b. Security package #2, which provides a 1/3 probability of reducing estimated losses by
$6 million and a 2/3 probability of not reducing estimated losses at all.
[The preference between negative prospects is the mirror image of the preference between
positive prospects (reflection effect)]
Scenario: You estimate the expected loss that would result from a successful attack at $6 million.
Given that estimate, which of the following two options would you choose?
a. Security package #1, which reduces estimated losses to $4 million.
b. Security package #2, which provides a 1/3 probability of reducing estimated losses









[Possibility versus probability of gains – high absolute value of outcome]
[When gains are probable, people will choose the prospect that offers certain gains]
Scenario: Which security package will you choose?
a. Security package #1, which provides a 45% chance of reducing expected losses by
$60,000.
b. Security package #2, which provides a 90% chance of reducing expected losses by
$30,000.
[When gains are possible but not probable, people will choose the prospect that offers larger
gain]
Scenario: Which security package will you choose?
a. Security package #1, which provides a 0.1% chance of reducing expected losses by
$60,000.
b. Security package #2, which provides a 0.2% chance of reducing expected losses by
$30,000.
[Possibility versus probability of gains – low absolute value of outcome]
[When gains are probable, people will choose the prospect that offers certain gains (certainty
effect)]
Scenario: Which security package will you choose?
a. Security package #1, which provides a 45% chance of reducing expected losses by
$6000.
b. Security package #2, which provides a 90% chance of reducing expected losses by
$3000.
[When gains are possible but not probable, people will choose the prospect that offers larger
gain]
Scenario: Which security package will you choose?
a. Security package #1, which provides a 0.1% chance of reducing expected losses by
$6000.











[People’s choices depend on framing of contingencies]
Scenario: Which of the following security packages will you choose?
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3b
3c
a. Security package #1, which reduces expected losses by $30,000.
b. Security package #2, which provides an 80% chance of reducing expected losses by
$45,000.
[In order to simplify the choice between alternatives, people often disregard components that the
alternatives share, and focus on the components that distinguish them (isolation effect)]
Scenario: Attacks fail 75% of the time, and are successful 25% of the time. Two products have
been identified that can be used if an attack is successful. Which of these would you choose?
a. Security package #1, which reduces expected losses by $30,000.
b. Security package #2, which provides an 80% chance of reducing expected losses by
$45,000.
Scenario: Which of the following security packages will you choose?
a. Security package #1, which provides a 25% chance of reducing expected losses by
$30,000.










People’s choices depend on framing of outcomes:
[People generally evaluate acts in terms of a minimal account, which includes only the direct
consequences of the act]
Scenario: An anti-virus package you had purchased for $10,000 had failed to offer any protection
against attacks. If you were now asked to purchase an anti-worm package for $10,000, will you
purchase it?
yes        no
[A sunk cost effect arises when a decision is referred to an existing account in which the current
balance is negative]
Scenario: An anti-virus package you had purchased for $10,000 had failed to offer any protection





5 [Lower probabilities are over-weighted (insurance effect)]
Scenario: There is a 0.001 chance that you will incur a damage of $2 million if you do not invest
in any security measures. Alternatively, you can invest $10,000 in a security package and avert
all possibility of damage. Will you invest in the security package?
yes        no
0.90*, 0.10
Table 1: [Hypotheses], Instrument, Expected Responses, and Observed Responses,
* significant at 0.05p <  (based on a one-proportion, one-tailed z-test)
Hypothesis 2 relates to how people react to prospects that are probable as against prospects that are merely possible. We
tested this hypothesis for both low (2c and 2d) and high (2a and 2b) absolute outcomes. In the former case, when gains are
probable (2c), we would expect people to be risk-averse with gains, as borne out by the significant support of this hypothesis.
However, the non-linear weighting function over-weights low probabilities, thereby making the decision-maker more risk-
seeking towards gains when gains are merely possible (2d). While this hypothesis shows the right direction, it is not
significant. For the case of high absolute outcomes, we find that while 2a is significantly supported, results of 2b are
inconclusive. This may be due to the fact that the value function is concave for gains, thereby reducing the effect of (over-
weighted) very low probabilities for high absolute outcomes.
Hypothesis 3 tests how the framing of contingencies affects people’s choices. This was done by breaking up Hypothesis 3
into 3 different questions. Question 3b is different from 3a in that it has an extra stage in the decision-making process. If the
second stage is reached, then 3b reduces to 3a. Also note that 3b is identical to 3c in terms of probabilities and outcomes.
However, as predicted by PT, a majority of people responded similarly to 3a and 3b, but differently to 3c. This is because, in
order to simplify the choice between alternatives, people often disregard components that the alternatives share to focus more
on the components that distinguish them. This hypothesis, while consistent with our results, was not significantly supported.
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Hypothesis 4 tests how the framing of outcomes affects decision-makers’ choices. We found no support for either minimal
account, or sunk-cost effects. In fact, the responses in both cases seemed to favor the opposite of what we expected. This may
be due to the context the questions were set in. For instance, in the case of 4b, the fact that the anti-virus package had failed,
would actually encourage people to buy another anti-virus package since they still need to protect their systems from viruses.
Similarly, in the case of 4a, the failure of an anti-virus package doesn’t necessitate the need for an anti-worm package.
Hypothesis 5 tests how the insurance effect plays out in people’s choices. We found significant support for the hypothesis.
Subjects prefer a small loss over a small probability of a large loss. This occurs because very low probabilities are generally
over-weighted.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The purpose of this research is to re-evaluate Prospect Theory and establish its relevance in the information security context.
Preliminary results have shown partial support for the Prospect Theory hypotheses tested in this context. However,
hypotheses 1b, 4a, and 4b were not supported, suggesting that in the context of investing in information security, decision
makers sometimes behaved in accord with PT and other times in accord with EUT. Therefore, we plan to conduct further
research to better understand the decision process underlying investments in information security.
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